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Abstroa- Due to electrical power restructuring, a dramatic 
change has been made to the generation and transmission sectors 
of the power industry. Rules and legislation are continuously 
changing. To promote more competition, transmission has to be 
expanded or npgraded to remove congestion and market power. 
Tbe cost allocation of new investment in transmission has to be 
recalculated. The sorialization methods of tbe past have been 
shown to be unfair to some market and network participants. The 
decentralization of cost allocation must be considered. The 
proposed paper provides a comparison between traditional cost 
allocation methods and a new cost allocation method based on 
agent-based game theory. A multi-generatorlbus system will be 
used to compare the cost aUocation methods. 
Index Ternis - Game theory, multi-agent, transmission 
investment, power system deregulation 
I. INTRODUCnON 
ransmission plays a crucial role in electricity markets 
since transmission links all generators and loads together. 
Transmission is the electricity super highway and 
responsible for increases in competition in the generator sector 
and interruption in the growth of load sector. This approach is 
based on the idea that both the consumer and the generation 
sector will benefit from the cost reduction and increases in 
sales. Therefore, the consumer and generation sectors should 
share the cost of any new line investment. The costs of the 
new line must be less than the costs of the benefits (congestion 
saving cost). Future growth of the load must also be 
considered. 
The Deparhnent of Energy (DOE) and the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) have recently indicated 
support for the principle of cost allocation, stating that the 
costs of the transmission upgrade or expansion should he 
defined by customers who need or benefit from the upgrade or 
expansion. Before deregulation of the power industry, all 
transmission projects costs were shared by participants in the 
load sector. The change of cost allocation structure requires 
the abandonment of the old cost allocation methods within the 
new market structure. The new paradigm for cost allocation 
suggests that parties who have the need and/or benefit from 
the new transmission investment should pay the costs. The 
new investment should not be socialized across all customers. 
T .  ” . 
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Socialization of costs harms customers who do not benefit. 
New projects providing economic benefits must recover some 
cost from those who receive the benefits. The use of a benefit- 
driven methodology, however, has some drawbacks. It may 
possibly slow investment and decrease reliability. 
The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) 
stated “The gap between the transmission expansion need and 
the proposed construction of transmission is widening. To 
support the reliability of the bulk power system, proper 
incentives must he developed to encourage transmission 
construction” [24]. The statistical data shows that plans for 
additional transmission lines decreased from 1994 to 1999. but 
started to increase from 1999 to the present [24]. 
Congestion cost is often the primary indicator for utilities in 
deciding whether to build a new transmission line. The new 
line will relieve constraints and gain access to lower cost 
generation between each end of the line. The cost of the new 
line will not be socialized to all users. A new line with 
multiple beneficiaries might negotiate joint support among 
users who will get benefit from the line [3, 71. 
In a decentralized market, all users realize that if there is no 
expansion of the new line to relieve the current congestion, the 
price of electricity will rise. Therefore, the increase in price 
results in a monopoly of the transmission business. The 
monopoly allows transmission companies to earn additional 
revenue, decreasing their financial interests for expanding the 
network. Since some transmission has recently been 
deregulated, the methods used in this paper will assume that 
customers and generators are allowed to build a new 
transmission line to relieve congestion and gain access to 
lower-priced electricity [ I ,  251. 
11. NETWORK EXPANSION 
An illustrated example of the limits of transmission lines and 
power generation is provided in Figure 1 and described later in 
section V. There are several techniques that can be used to 
rsnk possible locations for adding new lines to an existing 
system. A heuristic approach suggested hy [9, 131 is used to 
identify if a solution is feasible under the domain of a 
quadratic linear programming problem. The formula is 
expressed as: 
Copyright Iowa Stale University, 2004 
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Subject to 
BO+K'P, = P  
IB,,AOI 5 < 
Cooperative game theory is a branch of game theory that 
relates to games in which there are three or more players who 
are free to negotiate binding and enforceable agreements ahout 
the formation of coalitions and the divisions of the payoffs that 
result form their coordinated actions [lo, 11, 121. The payoff 
result is used to determine the percentage cost allocation of a 
new line to agent i. A cost allocation cooperative game is 




is the cost function. N agents group in m mutually exclusive 
where c, is the cost of adding a line j to the network, PD is the and excluding coa~itions. The value 
flow vector for the possible line, M is the number of possible configurations, 
new lines, p, is the active power (in P.u.) flowing through the 
added line j, i.e., the jIh element of PD, B is the matrix whose 
elements are the imaginary parts of the nodal admittance 
matrix of the existing network, 0 is the phase angle vector, K' 
is the transpose of the nodal phase connection matrix, P is the 
nodal injection power for the overall network, BL is a diagonal 
matrix whose elements are branch admittance. P ,  is the branch 
represents the 
that: 
(4) 6 =  {S,,SZ, ..., S,"} 
where 6 is a partition of NA fulfilling two conditions 
S, f @; j =1,2,..,m 
where 0 is the empty set 
s, n s, = Q  
The concept of economic use of the transmission network may 
he divided into two groups [ lY]: 
'13~ Shaples value (sv, has heen used t) pes 
uiproblems (2, 12, 221. 'lbc SV calculates a \,slue hacd on an 
indkidual's contributions among all members in a coalition. It 
is a u,neept from the n.person coTornte game. sv is 
weighted a\ eragc of marginal contrihutions of a member to all 
the pussihle contribution coalitions that a member participates. 
11 is asumed coalition is  formed. The formula for 
the Shapley Value is gib en h) : 
solve 
I j Canacity usaee. The argument is that lines arc 
dimensioned for peaking conditions, $0 that capacit) usage 
must he the guide to allocate payment among users. 
2)  Enero uswe. The argument is that lines are 
dimensioned within a network that must respond to a luad 
curve. 'Therefore, it is the energy usage by agents that must 
he the guide to dlocate payments among users. 
a 
~, = (,> -I)!(+ S ) !  
111. MULlI-AGENT AND GAME ITII~OKY [ r ( . ~ ) - v ~ . ~ - ~ i ] ) ]  ( 5 )  
\ e\:v n! 
€3) definition, an agent is an entir) that makes decisions 
according to h i s k r  o\\n interests, as well ac the actions of 
other A system \r.ith man) is 11 here I is ;I' ptqer, s is a coalitinn of players, s IS a number 
,..llej a multi-agent ssstem 15, 6,  15, 221, i n  a po\r.er of players in coalition S, n is the tow1 number of pla)ers. .? is 
nehvork, sc\,eml entities c;ln he representej by the set of all players. and is the char3cterisric function 
agents, such a genenton, loads, and transmission line coalit iun S .  
onners, each making a decision about the expansion of thr 
nenr.ork, ~ ) ~ i ~ ~ l l ~ ,  i t  is difilcul1 ,,, determine \\hich In order to reduce the compleairy o i  the Shapley valur, 
arc guing , pas for the ne,, tranSmiSsjon l i n e  Ketchpel introJuced the Bilatcral Shaplcy Value (RSVj 1231. 
'lhus, n e  propose a mul t i -ap t  approach to cost allocation of 
a new in\.eStment that aes intu Let ('S _c PI .I/ he a coalition wwturc on a given set of agunts 
player in the s)stem from the addition ofthe new line. A = ( a  ! , . . . , o m } :  \\here C', ~ C, c A is a (hilatcral) coalition of 
Jisjoint (n-agent) cu3l1tions C and C, (n ? 0). The Rilatrral 
Each player or agent Shaple) Value for some coalition C, in a hilatcral wdition C 
other agents to iorm a coalition. I t  is assumed that all agents is &fined a: 
act rationally [12]. This mcms the) prefer to reduce their 
electricir) price in the case of loads, or cam more money in 
the benetits of 
individually in  cooper.lion 
RSV,, ,. , (C,)  = 0.51(C.)~O.j( i~(C)-~(C'.))  ( 6 )  
I " . .. . . .  <-,.-,, . , , 
case of-generators [SI. There are no restrictions to form 
coalitions among the agents. The agents create coalitions that 
minimize their cost participation for a new transmission line. 
Both coalitions C, and C, are called founders of C, and ifc) 
denotes the self-value of coalition C. 
The joint cost is lower than the sum of individual costs 151. 
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The process to form a coalition among agents is based on the When congestion occurs, least-cost generation must oiien be 
approach of [18]. passed over for purposes of system security. The system 
operator acts as a clearing agent and manager of system 
A. Self Value Calculation: Each generator or load is security. The difference between LMP at two nodes is the cost 
represented by one agent. Each agent uses all available of transmission between the two nodes [19]. 
information to calculate its initial self-value. This value is 
calculated by the maximum value that the agent can get The LMP method is the dollar per MWh cost of supplying the 
from the new line. If the agent doesn't want to invest in the next incremental load to a specific location in the transmission 
new line, this value will be zero. grid. It is the basis for calculating the amount for which power 
producers will get paid and tbe amount that customers are 
B. Communication and Securitv Check All agents send charged for their loads. It is also a very important indicator of 
their self-value and the coalitions to independent market conditions. For example, areas that have numerous 
coordinators (ISO, RTO). The IS0 or RTO will check the amounts of inexpensive generation, but with few loads, will 
security of the coalitions and publish to all agents and each have lower energy prices than the locations that have high-cost 
coalition After founder agents receive a message back of generation and high load. Due to congestion, the loads on 
from the coordinator, each agent proceeds to calculate a the congested locations will have higher prices than those in 
new payoff to rank the order, form coalition with other less congested areas. If there is no congestion, the LMP is the 
agents, and find the optimal benefit for each agent in the same at all nodes. Therefore, each LMP is equal to the Market 
network. Clearing Price (MCP), since none of the transmission 
constraints is binding [14]. 
C. Rank Pavoff for Each Aaent: After receiving messages 
from the RTO, each agent proceeds to rank the order to V. ILLUSTRATION 
~~ 
form a 
made that the transmission line life is 10 years. The interest 
rate is fixed. 
with Other agents. The assumption was From our previous work on load forecasting, loa& have 
seasonal and time effects. The Monte simulation is used 
to generate the future load demand for the next 10 years of our 
5-bus system, as s h o w  in Figure 1. The demand growth is 
to be a 2% incremental increase every two The 
Net Present Value (NPV) 1201 is used to iudee the new 
D. Negotiation: Every agent begins to negotiate with other 
agents to get the optimum benefit for each agent. 
. . .  . . _  
transmission investment project. The interest rate is assumed 
constant at 5% a year. There is no new generator into the Iv. APPLrCAT1oN l" TRANsMlssloN PLANNING 
The multi-agent system based on cooperative game theory is market during this period. The benefit is judged based on cost 
used to form a coalition. The Locational Marginal Price savings from an LMP basis. 
(LMP) method [17] is utilized to judge the benefit of each 
player. The assumption used in the LMP method is that the 
overall benefit of each player must be increased after the new 
line is added to the network. If the overall benefit decreases, 
the new line will be rejected. 
By using the LMP method with the system that socializes all 
customers in the system, the postage stamp method 141 does 
not produce efficient price signals. The reason is because the 
customers who do not benefit from the new line must often 
pay for the line cost. In contrast, the LMP method has proven fl; Nodl Gene". 
to provide efficient price signals. The LMP method 1171 is 
most efficient signal. Load I h a d l  
3 4 
essential in achieving market efficiency when the price is the 
Determining the LMP is done most efficiently through a Figure 1: Five-bus testing system (before adding the new 
voluntary, bid-based market. Loads submit bids to the system invesment) 
operator to purchase power at a particular node for a 
maximum acceptable purchase price - that is, they inform the The system consists of four loads and four generators. The 
market what they are willing to pay for electricity as generator details are shown in Table 1. The average price of 
transmitted. Generators, on the other hand, submit to the each generator is different to make it more competitive in the 
system operator offers to sell electricity - at the sale price at current market design. The model assumes that no changes in 
the point of injection into the grid, but prior to transmission. the system, generation, and transmission over the planning 
The system operator then purchases and dispatches the period. All transmission lines have reactance 0.1, resistance 
generation in the order of offered price, lowest to highest, 0.01 and rating at 800. 
based on the selling price at the nodes on the bid and offer 
prices received. 
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Table I: Detail of generators 
Monte Carlo simulation is used to create the demand curve on 0 hodr 
an hourly basis. This demand curve has seasonal and time of 
use effects to make it more realistic. We use this data to 
calculate the average hourly load each year. Again, the growth Load 3 LO& 
~~ ~ 
Coalition 1 Bendit 
data isused to calculate the L b  at each node. 
Coalition Benefit 
I Load1 I Load3 I Load4 I LOA5 
Year0 I 960.8462 1 952.8296 I 564.1727 I 571.028 
Figure 2 illustrates the system after a new investment takes 
place. The new investment is the transmission line between 
node 1 and node 3. This line will remove some congestion and 
YcarI I 980.0632 I 971.8862 I 575.4561 I 582.4485 I 18.25 I 19.11 I 20 I 21.91 I 21.29 I 
0 34 $471,071,712.10 
1 -$31,405,479.72 35 $406,383,618.08 
3 $356,566,928.37 45 $I64,321,473.44 
Table 4: LMF' (avg) at each node after that new line is build 
[ Year10 1 1060.852 1 1052.001 1 622.8922 1 630.461 
Tahle 2: Load demand dnbil From the NPV analysis, the overall cost saving of the system ~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~ ~ 
will he 490M for the next 10 year. This meani if the &st of 
new investment is less than 490M, this line should he build. 
.. " I 15 I 14 I 55KS I A1 19 I 79114 Customers will save future electricitv cost. The next sten is to 
I Nodel I Node2 I Node3 I Node4 I Nodes 
.~ _ _  __ .- . rearu I 
15 I 35 1 56.26 I 41.55 I 30.05 use the Shapley Value to allocate the cost of this investment 
Year1 I and then compare it to the social cost and marginal loads. I I5 I 35 I 56.26 I 41.55 I 30~05 
Table 3: LMF' (avg) at each node before the new line is build 
The LMP calculator program from PA consultant is used to 
find the LMP at each node. The benefit of each agent is 
calculated h m  cost saving before and after the new 
investment takes place. This criterion is used to form a 
coalition as shown in Tahle 5 .  For example, coalition 1 
represents that only load 1 invests in the new transmission. 
The coalition (1,3,4) represents that load 1, load 3 and load 4 
are to invest in the new transmission. 
increase system reliability. After the line is complete, each 
node LMP will be changed. The benefit of the new investment 
is calculated from the cost savings of each node fiom the 
change in LMP. LMP is based on hourly basis and converted 
to a yearly expense. The Net Present Value method with an 
interest of 5% is used to calculate benefit value of each load. 
$439,666,232.38 
$132,915,993.72 
345 $520,888,401 .SI  
Table 5 :  Benefit of each coalition 
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Comparisons between each method, along with the results, are 
shown in Table 4. Each method gives different results due to [I] H A .  m, E. L. da Suva and F. D. ~aliana, “Modeling compeution in 
the different oersoectives heine considered. This is a win-win Transmission Emamion,” IEEE Tranracrionr on Power SWemx vol. 
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Method 1 
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. .  . .  
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hm coalition {1,3,4,5), ne agent (3), (41, 
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VIII. APPENDIX 
The Social weljare nrethod is a method that forced every load 
in the network to share all cost of the new investment h t h e  
network. It can be written as 
N is number of player 
C, is a cost allocation of player i 
Loadproportional nrerhod 
Letting 6, he the amount of load for player i, we can then 
write 
0, c, =- 
f: e, 
j=l 
C, is a cost allocation of player i 
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